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SEX, BUT NOT THE CITY: ADULT-
ENTERTAINMENT ZONING, THE FIRST
AMENDMENT, AND RESIDENTIAL AND
RURAL MUNICIPALITIES
Abstract: Adult entertainment's status as protected First Amendment
speech has resulted in a confusing series of U.S. Supreme Court cases
evaluating the zoning of adult businesses. Cases discussing the require-
ment that municipalities provide alternative avenues of communication
for adult businesses have raised many questions as to how rural and
residential municipalities may satisfy this obligation. This Note identifies
three solutions that would help frame this inquiry. First, state or county
legislative bodies should adopt countywide or statewide location restric-
dons on adult businesses. Second, courts should employ a regional
analysis of the alternative avenues requirement when evaluating adult-
entertainment zoning restrictions. Third, courts should undertake a
supply-and-demand analysis when assessing what constitutes sufficient
alternative avenues of communication, Adoption of these solutions would
help to ensure that the First Amendment obligations of rural and residen-
tial municipalities reflect the unique burdens of such municipalities while
maintaining appropriate protection for free speech.
INTRODUCTION
The topic of adult-entertainment zoning remains a controversial
subject in municipal politics.I Few zoning issues inspire as much legal
and political hand-wringing as the locations of adult businesses in a
municipality.2 Much of this controversy can be attributed to adult en-
tertainment's status as protected First Amendment speech, which re-
quires municipalities to be especially careful in their regulation and
restriction of such businesses. 5
1 See Ben Z, Hershberg, Courts Struggle to Balance Rights of Adult Stores, Cities, COURIER-J.
(Louisville, Ky.), Oct. 19, 2004, at 1A. For purposes of this Note, "adult-entertainment
business" and "adult business" are used interchangeably and include live nude and semi-
nude dancing establishments, adult movie 'theaters, adult bookstores, and other sexually
oriented businesses.
2 See id.
3 See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 566 (1991) (holding that adult enter-
tainment for commercial purposes "is expressive conduct within the outer parameters of
the First Amendment, though ... only marginally so"); Hershberg, supra note 1, at 1A.
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In recent years, many cities have engaged in well-publicized zon-
ing action to regulate and even to eliminate the presence of adult-
entertainment businesses within their borders. 4 These efforts are
largely a response to the adverse impacts adult businesses have on
surrounding communities. 5 A 1989 survey of studies done on the
topic, for example, showed that the presence of adult-entertainment
businesses in a neighborhood leads to decreases in property values,
increases in property crimes and sex crimes, and general neighbor-
hood deterioration.6
 When several adult businesses are concentrated
in a particular area, these effects are often worse.''
Rural and predominantly residential municipalities are especially
susceptible to the negative effects of adult businesses.8 The same 1989
study found that the negative impacts of adult businesses on communi-
ties are closely related to the businesses' proximity to residential areas. 9
In rural and residential municipalities, where most land is residential,
adult businesses may be necessarily closer to residential areas." Ac-
cordingly, adult businesses arguably pose a greater risk to the quality of
life in rural and residential municipalities than they do to the quality
of life in large cities, where there exists a greater amount of commer-
cially zoned acreage in which adult businesses may locate."
Despite these greater risks, zoning restrictions on adult businesses
in rural and residential municipalities are evaluated under a First
Amendment analysis developed primarily in consideration of cities with
large amounts of commercially zoned acreage." The U.S. Supreme
Court's most complete discussion of this analysis took place in 1986 in
City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., in which the Court upheld the
4 See Dan Barry & David Rohde, Giuliani Begins to See Results in Battle Against Sex shops,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 1998, at A29; Scott S. Greenberger, Combat Zone's Demise Foreseen, Bos-
TON GLOBE, July 5, 2003, at B1.
5 See MINN. ATTORNEY GEN., REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S WORKING GROUP
ON THE REGULATION OF SEXUALLY ORIENTED BUSINESSES (1989), reprinted in JULES B.
GERARD, LOCAL REGULATION or ADULT BUSINESSES app. B, at 522-28 (2004 ed.).
6 Id.
7 Id. at 524. Some municipalities nevertheless have chosen to minimize the overall ad-
verse effects of adult businesses by concentrating them in one area, thereby eliminating
them from other neighborhoods entirely. See BOSTON, MASS., ZONING CODE § 3-1A(d)
(2004); City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 50, 52 (1986) (holding con-
stitutional a zoning scheme that concentrated adult businesses in 5% of a city's land area).
8 See MINN. ATTORNEY GEN., supra note 5, at 529-30; see also Karen DeMasters, Is a
Buffer-Zone Law Fair if There Is No Room far a Buffer?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 1999, § 14, at 6.
9 See MINN. ATTORNEY GEN., supra note 5, at 529-30.
10 See id.; DeMasters, supra note 8, at 6.
11 See MINN. ArroRNEY GEN., supra note 5, at 529-30; DeMasters, supra note 8, at 6.
12 See Renton, 475 U.S. at 50, 53.
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zoning ordinance' of Renton, Washington, which effectively concen-
trated all adult-entertainment businesses in certain areas of the city. 13
Under Renton, an adult-entertainment zoning restriction is upheld if it
is (1) is intended to serve a substantial governmental interest and
(2) permits reasonable alternative avenues of communication. 14 To sat-
isfy the second, "alternative avenues" requirement of this test, the city
must show that a business owner has a reasonable opportunity to oper-
ate an adult business elsewhere within municipal boundaries. 15
The two-pronged Renton test was created for a city with large per-
centages of commercially zoned land, and thus applying the second
prong of the test to rural and residential municipalities, which have
substantially less commercially zoned land, has been problematic. 16
Courts have encountered great difficulty in determining how such
communities may satisfy Renton's alternative avenues requirement."
In these instances, the Supreme Court's case law as applied to rural
and residential communities is ari uncertain guide. 18
Consider the following hypothetical scenario. 19 A city attorney for
Blackacre Village, a small town surrounded by larger commercial cities,
is tasked with drafting the city's first adult-entertainment zoning ordi-
nance." Because it is a primarily , residential municipality, only 5% of
Blackacre's total land area is zoned for commercial use. 21
 To ensure
Blackacre meets its constitutional obligations under the First Amend-
ment, the attorney reviews Renton to determine what constitutes
sufficient alternative avenues of communication, the second require-
ment of the Renton test.22 In doing so, the attorney encounters some
significant, unanswerable questions." If Renton requires cities to allow
adult businesses to locate on 5%, of the municipality's available land,
does this mean Blackacre essentially must allow adult businesses
throughout its small commercial' core?24 Should the fact that other
13 id, at 50.
" Id.
16 See id. at 54.
16 See id. at 53; Keego Harbor Co. v. City of Keego Harbor, 657 F.2d 94, 96 (6th Cir.
1981); Township of Saddle Brook v. A.B. Family Ctr., Inc., 722 A.2d 530, 532 (NJ. 1999).
" See Keego Harbor Co., 657 F.2d at 96; Stiddle Brook, 722 A.2d at 532.
18 See Saddle Brook, 722 A.2d at 534.
19
 The facts from this scenario are loosely based on Keego Harbor Co., 657 F.2d at 96,
and Saddle Brook, 722 A.2d at 532.
" See Keego Harbor Co., 657 F.2d at 96; Saddle Brook, 722 A.2d at 532.
21 See Keego Harbor Co., 657 F.2d at 96; Saddle Brook, 722 A.2d at 532.
22 See Renton, 475 U.S. at 50, 53.
23 see id. at 53; Saddle Brook, 722 A.2d at 532, 535-36.
24 See Renton, 475 U.S. at 53.
628	 Boston College Law Reuiew
	 [Vol. 46:625
nearby cities provide a wealth of adult-entertainment businesses lessen
Blackacre's obligation, at least for purposes of the First Amendment? 25
What if a 1000-foot distancing requirement between adult businesses
and churches, schools, and residential areas effectively bans these busi-
nesses from Blackacre entirely?" The Supreme Court case law offers
few answers to these questions, leaving the city attorney little direction
in drafting the ordinance. 27
In response to these difficult questions, this Note argues that the
Supreme Court's adult-entertainment zoning jurisprudence leaves un-
answered the following four problems facing rural and residential mu-
nicipalities: the undetermined constitutionality of a total ban, vague
standards for evaluating the alternative avenues requirement, an inabil-
ity to enact sufficient distancing requirements, and a lack of regional
zoning of adult businesses. 28
 To address these problems, this Note pro-
poses three solutions: regional zoning of adult businesses, a regional
analysis of Renton's alternative avenues requirement, and a supply-and-
demand analysis of Renton's alternative avenues requirement.29
Part I.A of this Note reviews the Supreme Court's First Amend-
ment jurisprudence on content-neutral laws as it applies to adult-
entertainment zoning cases." Parts I.B, I.C, and I.D review in detail
three Supreme Court cases that discuss the requirement of adequate
alternative avenues of communication for adult-entertainment zoning
laws." Part 1.E analyzes three subsequent lower court cases that strug-
gled to apply Supreme Court case law to rural and residential com-
munities." Part II identifies and discusses the four problems that
adult-entertainment Supreme Court case law creates for rural and
residential municipalities and their adult-entertainment zoning laws. 33
Part III proposes three solutions to these problems, which legislators,
judges, and lawyers may adopt to ensure a more equitable application
of First Amendment case law to rural and residential municipalities. 34
25 See Saddle Brook, 722 A.2d at 535-36.
26 See id. at 532.
27 See Renton, 475 U.S. at 50, 53; Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61,76
(1981); Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50,71-73 (1976) (plurality opinion).
28 See infra notes 219-264 and accompanying text.
29 See infra notes 265-305 and accompanying text.
so See infra notes 35-61 and accompanying text.
31 See infra notes 62-174 and accompanying text.
32 See infra notes 175-212 and accompanying text.
33 See infra notes 213-264 and accompanying text.
34 See infra notes 265-305 and accompanying text.
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I. THE SUPREME COURT'S FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
CONCERNING ADULT-ENTERTAINMENT ZONING
AND ITS APPLICATION BY LOWER COURTS
A. The Content-Neutrality Doctrine
Central to the Supreme Court's adult-entertainment case law is
the interpretation of adult-entertainment zoning ordinances as con-
tent-neutral rather than content-based. 35 A content-neutral law con-
trols expression without regard to the speech itself or the speech's
impact.36 In this sense, laws that regulate the time, place, and manner
of speech, but not the actual speech itself, are content-neutral. 37
Therefore, an adult-entertainment zoning law that regulates the loca-
tion of a business is said to regulate only the secondary effects of such
speech, rather than the speech itself." In contrast, a content-based
law singles out certain messages, topics, or forms of expression for
regulation and restriction . 59
Although the theoretical distinction between content-neutral and
content-based laws may be clear, scholars have noted that the practical
55 See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986). The prevailing
scholarly consensus is that adult-entertainment zoning ordinances are, in most instances,
not content-neutral, despite Supreme Court holdings to the contrary. See, e.g., Clay Calvert,
Free Speech and Content-Neutrality: Inconsistent Applications of an Increasingly Malleable Doctrine,
29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 69, 103 (1997); Erwin Chemerinsky, Content Neutrality as a Central
Problem of Freedom of Speech: Problems in the Supreme Court's Application, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 49, 59
(2000); Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. Cm. L. REv. 46, 115 (1987).
Despite this problematic application, the Court continues to apply the content-neutrality
doctrine. See City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc. 535 U.S. 425, 434, 441 (2002) (plu-
rality opinion). Contra Wilson R. Huhn, Assessing the Constitutionality of Laws That Are Both
Content-Based and Content Neutral: The Emerging Constitutional Calculus, 79 bin. L.J. 801, 803,
810-12, 846 (2004) (discussing a new "constitutional calculus" test based on Justice John
Paul Stevens's concurring opinion in City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc.). There is grow-
ing discontent with the doctrine among the Justices, however. See Los Angeles, 535 U.S. at
444-45 (Kennedy, J., concurring). In 2002, in Los Angeles the Court upheld Los Angeles's
adult-entertainment zoning ordinance enacted in reliance on a twenty-year-old study. Id. at
430 (plurality opinion). Justice Anthony Kennedy, who was the fifth vote in a five-to-four
decision, wrote a concurring opinion in which he disagreed with the majority's contention
that the zoning ordinance was content-neutral. Id. at 445-46 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Noting that "the designation is imprecise," Justice Kennedy stated that the Court should
acknowledge that the law was content-based, but still subject it to the intermediate scrutiny
usually reserved for content-neutral laws. Id. at 444-45, 447 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Un-
der this interpretation, content-based adult-entertainment zoning laws would be treated as
an exception to the content-neutrality doctrine. See id. at 947 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
36 See Renton, 475 U.S. at 48.
37 See Calvert, supra note 35, at 74.
38 See Renton, 475 U.S. at 46.
" See Calvert, supra note 35, at 76.
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categorization of most laws is not.40
 In theory, the controlling ques-
tion for determining whether a law is content-neutral should be
whether the application of the law turns on the message or content of
the speech." The Supreme Court's analysis, however, is often incon-
sistent with this approach. 42
 Instead of analyzing the law on its face to
determine whether it singles out certain speech, the Court often con-
siders the intent or purpose of the legislation.43 In these instances, a
content-based law that is motivated by an apparent content-neutral
purpose—such as . the regulation of only the time, place, and manner
of speech—is considered content-neutral, even if the law is facially
con ten t-based . 44
For instance, a law that identifies particular areas of a city where
adult businesses may locate is content-based because, on the face of
the law, adult entertainment as a form of speech is singled out for dif-
ferential treatment.° If that law, however, were motivated by a desire
to limit the negative effects of adult entertainment on surrounding
communities, but not to eliminate the speech altogether, a court may
find the law content-neutral.° In finding as much, the court would be
ignoring facial evidence to the contrary. 47
As a result of this arguably inconsistent approach to content neu-
trality, some scholars have advocated abandoning the doctrine. 48 They
argue that most laws have both content-based and content-neutral ele-
ments, making categorization arbitrary. 49
 Many scholars nevertheless
see merit in the distinction, noting that the problem with the content-
neutrality doctrine is really one of application, not theory. 5° Under this
40 See Huhn, supra note 35, at 803.
1 ' See Chemerinsky, supra note 35, at 51.
42 See Calvert, supra note 35, at 103; Chemerinsky, supra note 35, at 59-60.
43
 See Chemerin sky, supra note 35, at 59-60. Scholars advocate an emphasis on the ef-
fects of the given restriction, rather than its intent, in evaluating content neutrality. See
Calvert, supra note 35, at 108-09; Chemerinsky, supra note 35, at 60-61; Huhn, supra note
35, at 803. Under this analysis, an ordinance restricting the locations and operations of
adult-entertainment businesses clearly restricts speech, making it content-based. See Chem-
erinsky, supra note 35, at 60-61.
44
 SeChernerinsky, supra note 35, at 59-60.
15 See id. at 60.
48 See, e.g., Renton, 475 U.S. at 48.
47 See Chemerinsky, supra note 35, at 60.
46 See, e.g., Huhn, supra note 35, at 826; Martin H. Redish, The Content Distinction in First
Amendment Analysis, 34 STAN. L. REV. 113,139-40 (1981).
49 See, e.g., Huhn, supra note 35, at 826.
" See Calvert, supra note 35, at 110.
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rationale, the Court has complicated the issue by considering legislative
intent when it should be looking at the law on its face. 51
According to these commentators, a consistent application of the
content-based/content-neutral distinction permits the Court to focus
its strictest scrutiny on content-based laws, which suppress speech
most severely, and to apply a more deferential level of scrutiny to less-
threatening content-neutral laws. 52 Whereas content-based laws pre-
sumptively violate the First Amendment," content-neutral laws are
upheld so long as they satisfy the two-pronged test outlined in City of
Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc. 54 First, the content
-neutral law must
serve a substantial governmental interest. 55 This is commonly satisfied
by the municipality showing it regulates only the negative secondary
effects of speech, such as crime or diminished property values, by re-
stricting the locations of adult-entertainment businesses rather than
the content of adult entertainment itself."
Second, the content-neutral law must leave open adequate alterna-
tive avenues of communication. 57 This alternative avenues requirement
is included because the First Amendment guarantees citizens the right
to share their message with those interested." As a result, in the adult
entertainment context, a content-neutral law must ensure adult busi-
nesses are afforded space to operate. 59
Three Supreme Court cases discuss municipalities' obligations to
provide sufficient alternative avenues of communication when enact-
ing adult-entertainment zoning. 6° Each has significantly influenced
lower court decisions regarding adult-entertainment zoning in resi-
dential and rural communities. 61
51 See id. at 108-09.
55 See id. at 74-75; Stone, supra note 35, at 54.
55 Renton, 475 U.S. at 46-47; see also R.A.V. v, City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992)
(holding unconstitutional a restriction on hate speech based on race, color, religion, or
gender).
" See Renton, 475 U.S. at 46-47.
55 See id. at 47.
55 See id. at 50.
57 See id.
55 See Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 654 (1981)
(holding constitutional a Minnesota state fair rule prohibiting the sale or distribution of
printed or written material except from fixed locations).
59
 See Renton, 475 U.S. at 54.
*3 See id. at 53-54; Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 76 (1981); Young
v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S, 50, 62-63 (1976) (plurality opinion).
51 See, e.g., Keego Harbor Co. v. City of Keego Harbor, 657 F.2d 94, 96-97 (6th Cir.
1981); Township of Saddle Brook v. A.B. Family Ctr., Inc., 722 A.2d 530, 533-34 (NJ.
1999). Two other frequently cited Supreme Court cases considering restrictions on adult
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B. The U.S. Supreme Court Upholds a Zoning Ordinance Dispersing Adult
Businesses: Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc.
In 1976, in Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., the U.S. Supreme
Court upheld a Detroit, Michigan, zoning ordinance that required
dispersal of adult-entertainment businesses .° As the first Supreme
Court adult-entertainment zoning case, Young established the authority
of cities to restrict the locations in which adult businesses may oper-
ate.63
 At issue were amendments to an "And-Skid Row Ordinance"
aimed at preventing the concentration of adult-entertainment busi-
nesses in Detroit." The ordinance placed two primary restrictions on
adult businesses." First, it prohibited adult theaters from being located
within 1000 feet of any two other "regulated uses."66 In addition to
adult theaters, "regulated uses" included adult bookstores, cabarets,
bars, dance halls, and hotels.° Second, the ordinance prohibited adult
theaters from locating within 500 feet of a residential area." Com-
bined, these restrictions had the effect of dispersing adult businesses.°
In Young, operators of two adult theaters in Detroit filed suit
against Detroit city officials, contending the ordinances were uncon-
stitutional." The United States District Court found for the city and
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed." The adult
theater operators made three primary arguments before the U.S. Su-
preme Court. 72
 First, they contended that the definition of adult thea-
ters was unconstitutionally vague. 73
 Second, they argued the restric-
entertainment are not discussed here. See Los Angeles, 535 U.S. at 433 (plurality opinion);
City of Erie v. Pap's A.M, 529 U.S. 277, 283-84 (2000). Los Angeles considers only the gov-
ernmental interest requirement of the Reflects test in reviewing Los Angeles's adult-
entertainment zoning law. See Los Angeles, 535 U.S. at 433 (plurality opinion). In City ofErie
v. Pap's A.M., the Supreme Court upheld a city ordinance banning nudity in public places,
but it did not consider a zoning ordinance, and thus did not apply the Renton test. See Pap's
A.M., 529 U.S. at 283-84.
62
 427 U.S. at 72-73 (plurality opinion).
63 See id. (plurality opinion).
" Id. at 52-54 (plurality opinion).
62 Id. at 52 (plurality opinion).
88 See id. (plurality opinion).
67
 Young, 427 U.S. at 52 n.3 (plurality opinion).
65 Id. at 52 (plurality opinion).
69 See hi. (plurality opinion).
7° Id. at 55 (plurality opinion).
71 See id. at 55-57 (plurality opinion); Am. Mini Theatres, Inc. v. Gribbs, 518 F.2d . 1014,
1021 (6th Cu. 1975); Nortown Theatre Inc. v. Gribbs, 373 F. Supp. 363, 371 (E.D. Mich. 1974).
72 Young, 427 U.S. at 58 (plurality opinion).
"See id. at 61 (plurality opinion).
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tions were unconstitutional as prior restraints on free speech. 74 Fi-
nally, they questioned the content neutrality of the law and its sup-
pression of protected First Amendment speech."
The plurality opinion by Justice John Paul Stevens quickly dis-
pensed with the adult theater operators' first two arguments." Stevens
stated that there was no question that adult theaters were within the
scope of the. supposedly vague definition." A claim of vagueness was,
in reality, a hypothetical issue, with no real bearing on the interested
parties' situation." As a result, the first argument was rejected." In
response to the second argument, Justice Stevens noted that the op-
erators had not contended that the ordinance placed a limit on the
total number of theaters, denied exhibitors access to the market, or
prevented the demand of the "viewing public" from being met. 80 Con-
sequently, the market for adult entertainment was "essentially unre-
strained,"81 and a restriction on the location where adult films could
be shown did not violate the First Amendment. 82
In response to the claim that the law was content-based, the
Court first acknowledged the fundamental importance of content
neutrality to the Court's jurisprudence, noting that content-based re-
strictions on expression would undermine the importance of a na-
tional forum and public debate es Nevertheless, Justice Stevens held
adult-entertainment zoning was an instance where the value of free
speech and public debate had to be balanced against at least two
competing interests.84
First, some laws can protect the "government's paramount obli-
gation of neutrality," and therefore remain constitutional, so long as
they are viewpoint-neutral, even if they are content-based.° Laws fal-
ling into this category include adult-entertainment zoning ordinances
because they identify only the locations where such speech may occur
but do not express an opinion of endorsement or disapproval about
'74 See id. at 62 (plurality opinion).
" See id. at 63-66 (plurality opinion).
76 See id. at 58-63 (plurality opinion).
77 See Young, 427 U.S. at 61 (plurality opinion).
78 See id. (plurality opinion)
79 See id. (plurality opinion)
f" See id. at 62 (plurality opinion).
61 Id. (plurality opinion)
82 See Young, 427 U.S. at 62 (plurality opinion).
86 Id. at 65-66 (plurality opinion).
84 See id. at 70 (plurality opinion).
66 See id. (plurality opinion)
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the speech itself. 86 Detroit's ordinance, in other words, had the same
effect on the location of adult businesses regardless of an adult film's
particular message or viewpoint, and therefore the government re-
mained neutral as to viewpoint. 87
 Second, society has a lesser interest
in protecting commercial material, such as borderline pornography,
than in protecting important political or philosophical debate." As
Justice Stevens famously noted, "few of us would march our sons and
daughters off to war to preserve the citizen's right to see 'Specified
Sexual Activities' exhibited in the theaters of our choice." 89
In short, these opposing concerns reflect a city's valid interest in
preserving "the quality of urban life.”" Given Detroit's countervailing
interests, the Court held the city was justified in restricting the location
of adult businesses because it intended only to limit the secondary ef-
fects of such businesses.91 The Young Court did not clarify, however,
whether other communities, including rural and residential ones, pos-
sess a similar interest in maintaining the quality of urban life, given that
urban life is not a fundamental attribute of those communities. 92
C. The U.S. Supreme Court Strikes Down a Ban on Live Entertainment:
Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim
In 1981, in Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, the Supreme Court
struck down Mount Ephraim, New Jersey's zoning ordinance prohibit-
ing any live entertainment, adult or otherwise. 93 Whereas Young had
considered a large city's interest in maintaining the quality of urban
life, Schad considered a small, primarily residential community's inter-
est in maintaining the character of its community.94 Mount Ephraim's
zoning ordinance identified various permitted uses in commercial
zones and further noted that any uses not expressly permitted were
prohibited.95
 Live entertainment, nude or otherwise, was implicitly
among the prohibited uses." The appellants in Schad operated an
adult bookstore that, in 1976, violated the ordinance by adding a coin-
88 See id. (plurality opinion)
8r
	 Young, 427 U.S. at 70 (plurality opinion).
26 See id. (plurality opinion)
89 Id. (plurality opinion)
9° See id. at 71 (plurality opinion).
91
 Id. at 71-72 (plurality opinion).
92 See 427 U.S. at 71-72 (plurality opinion).
98 See 452 U.S. at 72 (plurality opinion).
94 See Schad, 452 U.S. at 72; Young, 427 U.S. at 71 (plurality opinion).





operated peep show where a customer could watch a live nude dancer
performing. 97 They were found criminally guilty of violating the ordi-
nance, a decision which they appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court."
The Schad Court delivered five opinions.99 The majority opinion
written by Justice Byron White represented six Justices, including
himself, William Brennan, Potter Stewart, Thurgood Marshall, Harry
Blackmun, and Lewis Powell.'" Justices Blackmun, Powell and Stevens
each wrote concurring opinions, with Justice Stewart joining in Justice
Powell's opinion.'" Chief Justice Warren Burger and Justice William
Rehnquist were the only dissenters.'"
Justice White's majority opinion contained two primary hold-
ings.'" First, the Court held the appellants could challenge the ordi-
nance as being overly broad)" As Justice White noted, the ordinance
in question implicitly prohibited not only nude dancing, but also all
live entertainment in the city.'" Although he acknowledged that nude
dancing does possess some form of First Amendment protection, Jus-
tice White focused instead on the fact that the ordinance on its face
also prohibited other activities protected by the First Amendment,
such as commercial theater, musical concerts, and other perform-
ances.'" Such a broad ordinance accordingly required equally expan-
sive justification. 197
Second, Mount Ephraim did not sufficiently justify the breadth of
its ordinance, and thus failed to identify a substantial governmental
97 Id. at 62,
°a Id. at 64-65,
99 Id. at 62-77; id. at 77-79 (Blackmun, J., concurring); id. at 79 (Powell, J., concur-
ring); id. at 79-85 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 85-88 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
19° See Schad, 452 U.S. at 62-79. Professor Jules B. Gerard concludes otherwise, claim-
ing that White's opinion represented only three Justices ( Justices White, Brennan, and
Marshall) because justices Blackmun, Powell, and Stevens wrote separate concurring opin-
ions. JULES B. GERARD, LOCAL REGULATION OF ADULT BUSINESSES 209 (2004 ed.). This
argument ignores the fact that both Justice Blackmun's and Justice Powell's opinions ex-
plicitly note that they loin the Court's opinion." Schad, 452 U.S. at 77 (Blackmun, J., con-
curring); id. at 79 (Powell, J., concurring). As a result, Justice Stevens is the only concur-
ring Justice not to join justice White's opinion because he only concurs in the judgment,
not the opinion. See id. at 79 (Stevens, J., concurring).
1 ° 1 See id. at 77-79 (Blackmun, J., concurring); id. at 79 (Powell, J., concurring); id, at
79-85 (Stevens, J., concurring).
In Id. at 85 (Burger, J., dissenting).
1 °3 Id. at 65-67.
1 °4 Id. at 66.
1 °5 Schad, 452 U.S. at 65.
108 Id.
107
 See id. at 67.
636	 Boston College Law Review	 [Vol. 46:625
interest, which was required to uphold the content-neutral law as con-
stitutional.'" This was evident from the fact that the ordinance on its
face failed to offer anything in the way of a justification.'" Because the
ordinance only implicitly prohibited live entertainment, it was impossi-
ble to glean anything about the motives underlying the prohibition.'"
The majority further reasoned that Young did not control the
facts of Schad." In Young, Detroit had implemented only a zoning
scheme to disperse adult entertainment, whereas Mount Ephraim in
Schad attempted to ban it altogether.'" Moreover, Detroit had pro-
vided clear justification for its dispersal ordinance and had identified
clear negative secondary effects deriving from a concentration of
adult businesses.'" In this sense, Mount Ephraim had learned none
of the lessons of Young—the town offered no justifications and no evi-
dence for the claim that live entertainment, much less live adult en-
tertainment, created any negative secondary effects.'" As a result,
Mount Ephraim could not claim its ordinance was a valid restriction
on time, place, or manner of communication.'"
Although this holding alone was sufficient to strike down the or-
dinance and reverse appellants' conviction, Justice White's majority
opinion further discussed the alternative avenues requirement of the
content-neutrality doctrine." 6 The Court held that Mount Ephraim's
ordinance ensured no alternative avenues of communication could
exist because the ordinance was an outright ban on live entertain-
ment in the commercial zone of the Borough." 7 Young permitted only
the restrictive zoning of adult businesses in such a way that the market
was left "essentially unrestrained."lt" In contrast, Mount Ephraim at-




no See Schad, 452 U.S. at 67.
111 Id. at 71-72; see Young, 427 U.S. at 72-73 (plurality opinion).
112 Schad, 452 U.S. at 71; Young, 427 U.S. at 72-73 (plurality opinion).
115 See Young, 427 U.S. at 71 (plurality opinion).
114 See Schad, 452 U.S. at 73.
115 See id. at 75. More recently, the Supreme Court has expanded on what evidence is
sufficient to justify a time, place, and manner restriction on adult entertainment. See Los
Angeles, 535 U.S. at 430 (plurality opinion). In Los Angeles, the Court held that Los Angeles
could rely on a twenty-year-old study showing the negative secondary effects of adult busi-
ness to justify its ordinance as a valid content-neutral adult-entertainment zoning ordi-
nance. Id.
115 See Schad, 452 U.S. at 75-76.
" 7 See id. at 76.
118 427 U.S. at 62 (plurality opinion).
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tirely foreclosing the market for adult entertainment.'" This reason-
ing alone was enough to strike down the law.I 2°
Nevertheless, the Court offered some support for residential
communities attempting to justify a total prohibition on adult enter-
tainment."' In response to Mount Ephraim's claim that nearby mu-
nicipalities offered live adult entertainment, and that this availability
should satisfy the alternative avenues requirement, Justice White of-
fered the following analysis:
[Mount Ephraim's] position suggests the argument that if
there were countywide zoning, it would be quite legal to al-
low live entertainment in only selected areas of the county
and to exclude it from primarily residential communities,
such as the Borough of Mount Ephraim. This may very well be
true, but the Borough cannot avail itself of that argument in
this case. There is no countywide zoning in Camden County,
and Mount Ephraim is free under state law to impose its own
zoning restrictions, within constitutional limits. 122
Justice White thus seems to suggest that there may be instances in
which primarily residential communities may be able to rely on the
existence of adult entertainment in other locales as evidence that al-
ternative avenues for communication exist. 125 The prerequisite of
such an exception to the alternative avenues requirement, however, is
countywide—or perhaps statewide—zoning.' 24
Justices Blackmun, Powell, and Stevens each wrote concurring
opinions in response to Justice White's discussion of the alternative
avenues requirement. 125 Justice Blackmun reasoned that municipalities
should not be able to sidestep their First Amendment obligations by
Ilg See Schad, 452 U.S. at 76. Justice White noted that "our decision today does not es-
tablish that every unit of local government entrusted with zoning responsibilities must
provide a commercial zone in which live entertainment is permitted." Id. at 75 n.18.
120 See id. at 76-77.
121 See id. at 76.
'22 Id. (emphasis added). Those cases that have evaluated countywide zoning ordi-
nances restricting adult entertainment involve ordinances that apply only to unincorpo-
rated areas of a county. See, e.g., David Vincent, Inc. v. Broward County, 200 F.3d 1325,
1327,1329 (11th Cir. 2000); Intl Eateries of Am., Inc. v. Broward County, 941 F.2d 1157,
1165 (11th Cir. 1991).
122 See Schad, 452 U.S. at 76.
124
 See id.
'25 See id. at 77-79 {Blackmun, J., concurring); id. at 79 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at
79-85 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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pointing to the actions of other cities, even in the same county. 126 Jus-
tice Powell, with Justice Stewart joining, reasoned instead that some
communities—those primarily residential in character—should be able
to ban live adult entertainment altogether.'" Justice Stevens agreed,
noting that at the very least Mount Ephraim could show that adult en-
tertainment is available nearby, outside the limits of the Borough. 128
Likewise, Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justice Rehnquist, dis-
sented primarily because of Justice White's analysis of the alternative
avenues requirement, arriving at the same conclusion as the concurring
Justices." 29
 Chief Justice Burger asserted that small communities like
Mount Ephraim should be able to justify their adult-entertainment zon-
ing law by pointing to the availability of adult entertainment nearby.'"
Such a justification could hardly be thought to chill protected speech in
any given region because, as Chief Justice Burger stated, "' [c] hilling'
this kind of show business in this tiny residential enclave can hardly be
thought to show that the appellants' 'message' will be prohibited in
nearby—and more sophisticated—cities."'" Unlike Justice White, Chief
Justice Burger stopped short of requiring countywide zoning to permit
this arrangement.'" Rather, Chief Justice Burger argued that the natu-
ral distinction between smaller residential communities and larger,
"more sophisticated" cities permits a modified First Amendment analysis
for smaller, less urban locales.'"
Read together, eight of nine Justices in Schad suggest, either im-
plicitly or explicitly, that residential and rural municipalities may pos-
sess more flexibility as to the alternative avenues requirement than do
other municipalities.'" Schad thus reveals that the Burger Court expe-
rienced some anxiety regarding the burdens the First Amendment
placed on adult-entertainment zoning in rural and residential corn-
"6 See id. at 78 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
127 See id. at 79 (Powell, J., concurring).
128 See Schad, 452 U.S. at 84 n.11 (Stevens, J., concurring).
129 See id. at 85 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
is° See id. at 87 (Burger, Cj., dissenting).
' 3 ' Id. (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
132 See id. (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
133 See Schad, 452 U.S. at 87 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
154 See id. at 76; id. at 79 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 84 n.11 (Stevens, J., concur-
ring); id. at 87 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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munities. 135 What Schad did not do, however, was identify how later
courts were to respond to these anxieties.'"
D. The Supreme Court Upholds a Zoning Ordinance Concentrating
Adult Businesses: Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.
In upholding a zoning ordinance that concentrated adult busi-
nesses in certain areas of the city, Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion
in Renton offers the Court's fullest discussion of the alternative ave-
nues requirement to date.'" The Renton, Washington, ordinance in
question was enacted in April 1981 and restricted the locations in
which adult movie theaters could operate. 138 Renton, a suburb south-
east of Seattle with a population of approximately 32,000, had no
adult-entertainment businesses at the time of the ordinance's enact-
ment. 139 The city's ordinance prohibited such theaters from locating
less than 1000 feet from residential zones, single- or multiple-family
dwellings, churches, or parks, and less than one mile from schools. 1"
These restrictions effectively left 520 acres, or 5% of the land area of
Renton, available to such businesses. 141
A Renton property owner who had plans to open two adult movie
theaters in the prohibited areas filed suit, challenging the law as viola-
tive of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.' 42 In 1986, the U.S. Su-
preme Court upheld the ordinance.'" A key issue in the Court's analy-
sis of the Renton zoning ordinance was determining whether the law
was content-neutral or content-based.'** The Court acknowledged that
the ordinance did "not appear to fit neatly into either the 'content-
based' or the 'content-neutral' category." 145 Nevertheless, as in Young, it
held the law to be content-neutral because the City Council intended
only to regulate the negative secondary effects of adult entertainment,
135 See id. at 76; id. at 79 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 84 n.11 (Stevens, J., concur-
ring); id. at 87 (Burger, Cj., dissenting).
155 See id. at 76; id, at 79 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 84 n.11 (Stevens, J., concur-
ring): id. at 87 (Burger, Cj., dissenting).
157 See 475 U.S. at 53-55.
138 Id. at 44,
In Id.
140 Id. The ordinance was later amended to restrict such businesses to locations less
than 1000 feet from schools instead of one mile. Id. at 45.
141 Id. at 53.
142 Renton, 475 U.S. at 45.
145 See id. at 54-55.
144 See id. at 47.
145 Id.
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rather than the actual expression, by restricting the locations in which
such businesses operated.' 4° In other words, the legislative intent,
rather than the statutory language, contributed to the law's content
neutrality."7
Having established that the ordinance was content-neutral, the
Court then turned to the two-part test for content-neutral laws—
whether the law was designed to serve a substantial government inter-
est, and whether it permitted adequate alternative avenues of corn-
munication."° It was clear to the Court that the ordinance served a
substantial government interest because the Court emphasized, as it
had in Young, that "a city's 'interest in attempting to preserve the
quality of urban life is one that must be accorded high respect.'""s
The City of Renton claimed, and the Court accepted, that the experi-
ences of nearby Seattle showed that widespread dispersion of adult-
entertainment businesses led to negative secondary effects on com-
munity and neighborhood improvement efforts and contributed to
blight's° The fact that the experiences of Seattle, and its recommen-
dation to concentrate adult business, conflicted directly with the ex-
periences of Detroit, which dispersed them, was not problematic to
the Court. 151
 Rather, the Court reasoned, cities must be accorded
great flexibility in the regulation of such businesses and the "admit-
tedly serious problems they engender," especially with regard to their
goals of preserving the quality of urban life. 152
 As a result, the Court
held the Renton ordinance served a substantial governmental inter-
est, thus satisfying the first prong of the First Amendment test for con-
tent-neutral ordinances.Iss
The Court next considered whether the Renton ordinance en-
sured reasonable alternative avenues of communication for adult-
entertainment businesses.'" The situation the Court faced in Renton,
however, differed from that in Young and Schad. 155 In Young, the law
satisfied the alternative avenues requirement because the market was
1146 See id. at 48.
147 See Renton, 475 U.S. at 48; see also Chemerinsky, supra note 35, at 59-60.
I" See Renton, 475 U.S. at 50.
149 Id. (quoting Young, 427 U.S. at 71 (plurality opinion)).
1" See id. at 51.
151
	 id. at 51-52; Young, 427 U.S. at 71 (plurality opinion).
52
 Young, 427 U.S. at 71 (plurality opinion).
155 See Renton, 475 U.S. at 51.
154
 See ed. at 53.
155 See Id. at 52-53; Schad, 452 U.S. at 76; Young, 427 U.S. at 62 (plurality opinion).
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unrestrained. 1" In Schad, the law failed the alternative avenues re-
quirement because adult businesses were totally precluded from locat-
ing in Mount Ephraim.'" In Renton, however, the market was some-
what restrained by virtue of businesses' concentration, but it was not
totally eliminated. 1"
The Court first analyzed the land-use scenario in Renton for adult
businesses.' 59 Even with the ordinance in effect, the Court noted that
there were 520 acres, greater than 5% of Renton's total land area,
where adult-entertainment businesses could legally locate.'" Justice
Rehnquist further rejected respondents' argument that most of this
land either was not available or was commercially unviable. 161 He rea-
soned that the commercial viability of the available land is irrelevant for
a First Amendment analysis because this fact goes only to the issue of
marketability of the business, not the business's free expression.'" As a
result, all 520 acres were considered available to adult-entertainment
businesses wishing to locate in Renton.'"
The Court did not offer a clear explanation of the connection
between the amount of available acreage, or even the percentage of
land available, and the determination of whether alternative avenues
of communication were adequate. 1" It noted, however, that the city
had made "some areas" open to adult-entertainment businesses wish-
ing to engage in protected expression and that these areas provided a
"reasonable opportunity" to operate such businesses.'" The Court
therefore held that the City of Renton had satisfied the alternative
avenues requirement of the test for content-neutral laws, and the or-
dinance therefore passed First Amendment muster.'"
Lower courts have struggled to apply Renton's alternative avenues
analysis to other situations, but they have generally employed two dif-
ferent tests.'" One test concludes that a city's available land for adult-
06 427 U.S. at 62 (plurality opinion).
167 See 452 U.S. at 76.
166 See 475 U.S. at 52-53.
162 See id. at 53.
160 See id.
161 Sec id. at 53-54,
162 See id.; see also A.F.M., Ltd. s City of Medford, 704 N.E.2d 184,186 n.4 (Mass. 1999)
(holding that information about whether available property was for sale or lease is irrele-
vant to the constitutionality of a zoning restriction).
162
 See Renton, 475 U.S. at 53-54.
164
 See id.
162 See id. at 54.
166 See id. at 54-55.
167 See infra notes 168-174 and accompanying text.
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entertainment businesses may be considered adequate by a court if it
is a reasonable percentage of the city's total land area. 168
 This ap-
proach relies heavily on Renton's analysis of the percentage of land
available, and attempts to determine whether the 5% found there is
constitutionally mandated. 169
 As interpreted by courts, the reason-
ableness of the percentage varies greatly depending on the size and
urban qualities of the municipality.'" For example, courts have dif-
fered over whether the appropriate denominator in such an equation
should be the city's total land area—as used in Renton—or only com-
mercially zoned areas."'
Alternatively, the second test concludes that a municipality's avail-
able land for adult businesses may be considered adequate if the total
number of sites meets the demand as measured by population size, the
number of existing adult businesses, or the number of existing and po-
tential adult-entertainment businesses. 172
 This approach is, at its base, a
supply-and-demand analysis, in which the analysis itself only varies de-
pending on how supply (the amount of land available) and demand
na Compare Specialty Malls of Tampa v. City of Tampa, 916 F. Supp. 1222, 1231 (M.D.
Fla. 1996) (holding an ordinance leaving 7.5% of the city of Tampa's land available for
adult entertainment was constitutional because it exceeded the 5% figure found constitu-
tional in Renton), affd, 109 F.3d 770 (11th Cir. 1997), with D.H.L. Assocs. v. O'Gorman, 199
F.3d 50, 59-60 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding an ordinance leaving 0.09687% of land available
for adult businesses in Tyngsborough, Massachusetts, (population 9500) was constitutional
because the percentage of acreage available is "relevant but not dispositive"), cert. denied,
529 U.S. 1110 (2000).
' 69 See Specialty Malls of Tampa, 916 F. Supp. at 1231.
10 Compare Specialty Malls of Tampa, 916 F. Supp. at 1231 (holding that leaving 7.5% of
the city of Tampa's land available for adult entertainment was constitutional because it
exceeded the 5% figure found constitutional in Renton), with O'Gorman, 199 F.3d at 59-60
(holding that leaving 0.09687% land available for adult businesses in Tyngsborough, Mass.,
(population 9500) was constitutional because the percentage of acreage available is "rele-
vant but not dispositive").
171 Compare Renton, 475 U.S. at 54, with Ambassador Books & Video, Inc. v. City of Little
Rock, 20 F.3d 858, 864-65 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that 6.75% of zoned business acreage
constituted sufficient alternative avenues).
172 See O'Gorman, 199 F.3d at 60-61. Courts have held adequate avenues of communica-
tion existed where as few as two sites were available. See, e.g., Northlake Blvd. Corp. v. Vill.
of N. Palm Beach, 753 So. 2d 754, 758 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000); see also Lakeland Lounge
of Jackscln, Inc. v. City of Jackson, 973 F.2d 1255, 1260 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that "[a]s a
matter of arithmetic," a city has provided a sufficient number of sites if the current num-
ber of adult-entertainment businesses is less than the available sites); Alexander v. City of
Minneapolis, 698 F.2d 936, 938-39 (8th Cir. 1983) (holding an ordinance unconstitutional
when it created only twelve sites for thirty existing businesses); Centerfold Club, Inc. v. City
of St. Petersburg, 969 F. Supp. 1288, 1305-06 (M.D. Fla. 1997) (holding that nineteen sites
for a population of 238,726—or one business per 12,565 persons—constituted insufficient
alternative avenues of communication).
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(the number of persons wishing to open or visit adult businesses) are
defined.'" Under either test, however, the constitutional sufficiency of
a municipality's adult-entertainment zoning will depend largely on how
the test is framed and how the requirements are determined. 174
E. Lower Courts and Rural or Residential Communities
Lower courts, both state and federal, have struggled with how to
apply the Supreme Court's holdings in Young, Schad, and Renton to
rural and residential communities. 175 Some cases in particular have
interpreted these opinions and reached their own holdings as to rural
and residential communities' responsibilities in providing adequate
alternative avenues of communication.'"
For example, in 1981, in Keego Harbor Co. v. City of Keego Harbor, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit struck down Keego Harbor,
Michigan's prohibition on adult movie theaters. 177 As the Sixth Circuit
noted in its decision, Keego Harbor was "an unusual community" and a
"largely recreational town" of about 3000 people.'" The United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan had upheld, in an
175 See O'Gorman, 199 F.3d at 60-61.
174 See Renton, 475 U.S. at 54; see also Young v. City of Simi Valley, 216 F.3d 807, 822 (9th
Cir. 2000) ("Data regarding the number of sites available for adult use is meaningless without
a contextual basis for determining whether that number is sufficient for a particular locale.").
The author of a 2002 student comment offered a differing interpretation of the alternative
avenues requirement. See Ashley C. Phillips, Comment, A Matter of Arithmetic.. Using Supply and
Demand to Determine the Constitutionality of Adult Entertainment Zoning Ordinances, 51 EMORY I.J.
319, 322 (2002). The author suggests there are actually three distinct tests employed by
courts: a "population proportion" test, a "total acreage" test, and a "supply and demand" test.
See id. The interpretation of the case law in this Note differs in that it collapses the author's
second and third tests into one, but makes further distinctions based on to what the total
acreage is being compared. See id.; supra notes 167-173 .and accompanying text.
175 See, e.g., Keego Harbor Co., 657 F.2d at 98; Saddle Brook, 722 A.2d at 534.
176 See Keego Harbor Co., 657 F.2d at 98; Diamond v. City of Taft, 29 F. Supp. 2d 633, 646
(F.D. Cal. 1998), aff'd, 215 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1072 (2001); Sad-
dle Brook, 722 A.2d at 535-36. In contrast to this case law discussing residential and rural
municipalities, in 2001, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida in Univer-
sity Books Video, Inc. v. Miami-Dade County discussed a larger geographical unit's responsi-
bilities as to adult-entertainment zoning in holding that 0.0092% of city acreage zoned for
adult businesses was insufficient given Miami-Dade County's status as a "large metropolitan
area with a population of well over one million." 132 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1014 (SD. Fla.
2001). The court noted that cities in major urban areas must provide more than "a few
dozen acres" to ensure adequate avenues of Communication for adult businesses. See id.
177
 657 F.2d at 95. Keego Harbor Co. was decided more than two months after the deci-
sion in Schad. Schad, 452 U.S. at 61; Keego Harbor Co., 657 F.2d at 94. The Keego Harbor Co.
court discusses Schad in detail. See Keego Harbor Co., 657 F.2d at 97-98.
178 Keep Harbor Co., 657 F.2d at 96.
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oral opinion, Keego Harbor's ordinance after evaluating it under the
content-neutrality doctrine. 179 After finding its purpose sufficiently
justified by the city, the district court judge evaluated the alternative
avenues requirement on a region-wide basis, finding that "the market
[for adult entertainment] embraces most if not all of Oakland County.
There is nothing in the law that should[,] nor should there be[,] that
requires each and every hamlet, no matter how small, to provide a
space for explicit sex films."18°
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed. 181 Its holding, however,
addressed only the first prong of the content-neutrality doctrine, con-
cluding only that Keego Harbor had failed to justify the ordinance
sufficiently. 182 The holding left untouched the district court's findings
as to the alternative avenues requirement. 183 Moreover, the court ex-
plicitly noted that it did not intend to reverse the district court as to
these issues: "We do not hold that every unit of government, however
small, must provide an area in which adult fare is allowed. "184 The
Sixth Circuit thus explicitly declined to address, either positively or
negatively, the district court's holding as to alternative avenues, while
it simultaneously preserved the district court's analysis and emphasis
on a regionalized approach to alternative avenues. 185
In 2000, in Diamond v. City of Taft, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit affirmed a finding by the Eastern District of Califor-
nia that the California city's zoning ordinance provided a sufficient
178 Id.
180 Id.
lin See id. at 95.
182 See id. at 98-99.
183 See Keego Harbor Co., 657 F.2d at 99.
184 Id.
lea See id. In 1998, in Wolfe v. Village of Brice, the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Ohio interpreted Renton as overruling the Sixth Circuit's decision in Keego Har-
bor Co. See 997 F. Supp. 939, 944-45 (S.D. Ohio 1998). The court noted that Keego Harbor
Co.'s interpretation of Schad 'appears to have been closed by the Renton Court, when that
Court held that the First Amendment requires that a city refrain from effectively denying
citizens a reasonable opportunity to open and to operate an adult theater within the city."
Id. at 945. Although Renton does require most communities to permit adult businesses, it
stops shJat of requiring all communities to do so. See Renton, 475 U.S. at 48-50. It further
permits all communities to protect their quality of life against the negative secondary ef-
fects of such businesses. See id. at 50. As such, Renton's holding leaves open the possibility
that some small communities that are less sophisticated in nature may ban adult uses en-
tirely under the First Amendment. See id. at 48-50. Chief Justice Burger endorsed this pre-
cise notion in his dissenting opinion in Schad, which Justice Rehnquist, author of the ma-
jority opinion in Renton, joined. See Renton, 475 U.S. at 43; Schad, 452 U.S. at 87 (Burger,
CJ., dissenting).
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number of alternative sites for adult entertainment when there were
seven available sites for a town of 6800 people.' What is significant
about Diamond, however, is the means by which the district court judge
determined what sites were available to adult businesses in the area. 187
After noting that Taft was a "rural town" and that it "is possible to
travel from one end of the developed area of the city to the other in a
matter of minutes," the court analyzed in detail the sites the city
identified as available to adult-entertainment businesses. 188 Among
those analyzed were five sites in a commercially zoned area located on
state highways."9 As the court noted, the sites were outside Taft's city
limits but within Taft's "Sphere. of Influence." 190 Although unclear
from the opinion, this comment presumably responds to an argument
made by the City of Taft that sites outside city limits should qualify as
part of the available market if they are perceived as part of the general
city area. 191
The court ultimately found these five sites unavailable by virtue of
their location within a required 1000-foot buffer of establishments fre-
quented by minors. 192 In so holding, however, the court did not decide
whether sites within a city's "Sphere of Influence," but outside city lim-
its, could be considered alternative avenues for such businesses.'" Al-
though it sidestepped this issue, the court noted that smaller towns
and communities deserve different treatment when it comes to the
alternative avenues requirement. 194 Its rationale for this premise was
twofold.tm First, smaller communities possess smaller economic mar-
kets and correspondingly smaller demands for commercial First
Amendment speech like adult entertainment.'" Second, rural com-
munities typically have smaller commercial zones in comparison to
residentially zoned land, and thus should be permitted to provide
comparatively less space to adult businesses.'" Although the court's
ultimate decision as to these five lots was on separate grounds, the
188 215 F.3d 1052, 1058 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1072 (2001).
187 See Diamond, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 638.
188 See id. at 636-39.
188
 See id. at 638.
I" Id.
181 See id.
192 See Diamond, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 642.
10 See id. at 643 n.12.
I" See id. at 646.
I" See id. at 642, 646.
188 See id. at 646.
187 See Diamond, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 642.
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court's fundamental premise identifies a separate means of handling
smaller communities when it comes to zoning for adult businesses.'"
In 1999, in Township of Saddle Brook v. A.B. Family Center, the Su-
preme Court of New Jersey relied on similar justifications to hold that
a region wide analysis of the alternative avenues requirement is ap-
propriate.'" The court reversed a trial court's finding of unconstitu-
tionality of a state statute requiring dispersal of adult businesses. 200
The state law imposed a ban on adult businesses within 1000 feet of
any place of worship, school, school bus stop, playground, or residen-
tial area."' The effect of this statute was a prohibition on the opera-
tion of any adult bookstores in Saddle Brook, New Jersey. 202 In up-
holding the statute, the court reasoned that the alternative avenues
requirement can be evaluated on a region-wide, rather than munici-
pality-wide, basis. 203
Central to the court's reasoning on this issue was the U.S. Supreme
Court's decision in Schad.204
 The New Jersey court quoted at length
Schad's suggestion that a region-wide analysis of alternative avenues may
be sufficient, and further justified this by pointing to later federal cases
coming to a similar conclusion." 5
 This precedent thus led the court to
decide that, when evaluating the alternative avenues available, the
1 " See id. at 646; see also City of Crystal v. Fantasy House, Inc., 569 N.W.2d 225, 230-31
(Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that 0.9% of Crystal's overall land and 15% of its indus-
trial and commercial zones satisfied the alternative avenues requirement because of the
city's "overwhelmingly residential character and conservative planning practices").
199 See 722 A.2d at 536.
21'91 Id. at 531-32.
2°' Id. at 532.
402 Id. at 531. The state statute in question provides in pertinent part as follows:
Except as provided in a municipal zoning ordinance adopted pursuant to
NJ.S.2C:34-2, no person shall operate a sexually oriented business within
1,000 feet of any existing sexually oriented business, or any church, syna-
gogue, temple or other place of public worship, or any elementary or secon-
dary school or any school bus stop, or any municipal or county playground or
place of public resort and recreation, or any hospital or any child care center,
or within 1,000 feet of any area zoned for residential use.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:34-7(a) (West 2004). New Jersey's distancing statute is relatively
unique for adult-entertainment zoning in the United States. See DeMasters, supra note 8, at
6. Nevertheless, as the court in Saddle Brook noted, the statute "is not a statewide zoning
regulation for sexually oriented businesses, [but] it does constitute a statewide restriction
on their location." 722 A.2d at 535. The statute also authorizes municipalities to override
the restriction by enacting their own more permissive ordinance. Id.
203 See Saddle Brook, 722 A.2d at 535.
2°4 See Schad, 452 U.S. at 76; Saddle Brook, 722 A.2d at 533-34.
205 See Saddle Brook, 722 A.2d at 533-34.
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lower court should consider "areas located in other municipalities
`within reasonable proximity to the Saddle Brook location."298
The New Jersey Supreme Court's holding in this case, however,
was limited to the evaluation of state statutes, not local zoning ordi-
nances.297 In this sense, the court advocated only a scope of analysis
consistent with the scope of the law in question. 208 It did not, however,
advocate an analysis of the alternative avenues requirement that con-
sidered availability beyond the geographic coverage of the law itself,
as would be the case when considering countywide availability to as-
sess a municipal ordinance."9
Keego Harbor Co., Diamond, and Saddle Brook illustrate the ways in
which lower courts have interpreted the alternative avenues require-
ment for rural and residential communities. 21° In each, there is a
common question, first articulated by Chief Justice Burger in Schad: if
the alternative avenues requirement truly considers only the availabil-
ity of other opportunities for protected speech, why should nearby
areas, beyond municipal boundaries, not qualify?211 Although this
question is definitively answered , only in Saddle Brook, all three cases
indicate a particular sensitivity to the needs of rural and residential
communities in relation to adult businesses. 212
H. PROBLEMS FACING RURAL AND RESIDENTIAL MUNICIPALITIES IN
ZONING ADULT-ENTERTAINMENT BUSINESSES CONSISTENT
WITH THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Courts have struggled to apply the Supreme Court's adult-
entertainment zoning jurisprudence to rural and residential munici-
palities. 2" In 1981, in Keego Harbor Co. v. City of Keego Harbor, the U.S.
206 See id. at 535 (quoting Township of Saddle Brook v. A.B. Family Ctr., Inc., 704 A.2d
81, 89 (Nj. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998)). Reasonable proximity is to be determined by "evi-
dence of regional marketing patterns, availability of public transportation and access by
automobiles, geographical distribution of customers at comparable sexually oriented busi-






21° See Keep Harbor Co., 657 F.2d at 99; Diamond, 29 F. Supp, 2d at 646; Saddle Brook, 722
A.2d at 535.
211 See Schad, 452 U.S. at 87 (Burger, Cj., dissenting); Keep Harbor Co., 657 F.2d at 99;
Diamond, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 646; Saddle Brook, 722 A.2d at 535.
212 See Keego Harbor Co., 657 F.2d at 99; Diamond, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 646; Saddle Brook, 722
A.2d at 535,
212 See Keego Harbor Co. v. City of Keego Harbor, 657 F.2d 94, 99 (6th Cir. 1981); Dia-
mond v. City of Taft, 29 F. Supp. 2d 633, 646 (E.D. Cal. 1998), affd, 215 F.3d 1052, 1058
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Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit struck down Keego Harbor's zon-
ing ordinance while declining to hold that every municipality must
provide alternative avenues of communication within their borders.214
Similarly, in 2000, in Diamond v. City of Tait the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit affirmed a district court decision that declined to
decide whether sites outside municipal boundaries but within a city's
"Sphere of Influence" could be considered under the alternative ave-
nues requirement. 219
 In contrast, in 1999, in Township of Saddle Brook v.
A.B. Family Center, Inc., the Supreme Court of New Jersey held constitu-
tional a state statute that effectively banned adult businesses from a
residential municipality so long as there were nearby alternative ave-
nues of communication.216
 Read together, these cases suggest the
difficulties courts confront in applying the U.S. Supreme Court's First
Amendment case law on adult-entertainment zoning to rural and resi-
dential municipalities.217
 In response to this case law, this Note suggests
four distinct problems rural and residential municipalities face in zon-
ing adult-entertainment businesses consistent with the First Amend-
men t.218
A. Undetermined Constitutionality of a Total Ban
The principal problem relative to adult-entertainment zoning
cases is that it is unclear whether rural and residential municipalities
may enact a total ban on adult entertainment.219
 In 1986, in City of Ren-
ton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court held that the First
Amendment required Renton, Washington—a city of 32,000 people—
to refrain from denying adult businesses "a reasonable opportunity to
(9th Cir. 2000), art, denied, 531 U.S. 1072 (2001); Township of Saddle Brook v. A.B. Family
Cu'., Inc., 722 A.2d 530, 535 (Ni. 1999). These cases are, of course, by no means the only
attempts at applying this case law. See, e.g., Young v. City of Simi Valley, 216 F.3d 807, 822-
23 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that four available sites for adult businesses was adequate for a
city of 100,000 when no such businesses currently existed and only one application was
pending, but acknowledging the "chilling effect" some ordinances may have on prospec-
tive adult businesses); City of Crystal v. Fantasy House, Inc., 569 N.W.2d 225, 230-31
(Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that 0.9% of Crystal's land area constituted adequate al-
ternative avenues of communication, given Crystal's "overwhelmingly residential character
and conservative planning practices").
214 See 657 F.2d at 99.
215 215 F.3d at 1058; Diamond, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 638, 646.
216
 722 A.2d at 535-36.
217 See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 54 (1986); Keego Harbor
Co., 657 F.2d at 99; Diamond, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 646; Saddle Brook, 722 A.2d at 535-36.
218 See infra notes 219-264 and accompanying text.
212 See GERARD, supra note 100, at 214-46.
2005]	 Adult-Entertainment Zoning 	 649
open and operate."22° A broad reading of Renton's holding suggests
that every municipality must provide space for adult businesses. 221
Such a reading, moreover, is consistent with the Court's interpretation
of the First Amendment as prohibiting the suppression of speech in
one locale merely because such speech is allowed elsewhere. 222
Nevertheless, there are two primary reasons that a total ban may
still be permissible in rural and residential communities. 223 In 1981, in
Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, the U.S. Supreme Court struck
down a city's zoning ordinance prohibiting adult entertainment, but
explicitly declined to hold that every municipality, no matter how
small, must allow such entertainment. 224 Furthermore, five of nine
justices in Schad—including Justice Rehnquist, the author of the Ren-
ton majority opinion—believed that some small communities should
be able to exclude adult entertainment completely when such enter-
tainment is available nearby. 225 As a result, there remains an unre-
solved conflict between Renton and Schad as to the particular obliga-
tions of smaller rural and residential communities in permitting adult
businesses when space for such businesses is nearby but outside a
town's borders.228 Although larger cities clearly must provide alterna-
tive avenues of communication within their borders, it is still unclear
whether rural and residential municipalities must do the same. 227
B. Unclear Standards forRenton 's Alternative Avenues Requirement
The second problem is that, even assuming that rural and resi-
dential municipalities must provide alternative avenues of communi-
5" 475 U.S. at 54.
221 See id.
222 See id.; see also Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61,76-77 (1981).
223 See Schad, 452 U.S. at 75 n.18.
244 Id. ("[O]ur decision today does not establish that every unit of local government
entrusted with zoning responsibilities must provide a commercial zone in which live enter-
tainment is permitted.").
215 See id. at 79 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 84 n.11 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 87
(Burger, C.j., dissenting). justices supporting such a ban were justices Powell, Stewart, and
Stevens in their concurring opinions and Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist in
Chief Justice Burger's dissenting opinion. Id. at 79 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 79 (Stev-
ens, J., concurring); id. at 85 (Burger, CJ., dissenting); see also GERARD, supra note 100, at
215. State court case law also supports this position. See e.g., Saddle Brook, 722 A.2d at 531.
For instance, the immediate effect of the state statute upheld in Saddle Brook was a total
ban on adult businesses within Saddle Brook. Id. The New Jersey Supreme Court impliedly
upheld this statute on the understanding that space for adult-entertainment businesses was
available in nearby municipalities. See id. at 535-36.
226 See Renton, 475 U.S. at 54; Schad, 452 U.S. at 75 n.18.
227 See Renton, 475 U.S. at 54; Schad 452 U.S. at 75 n.18.
650	 Boston College Law Review	 [Vol. 46:625
cation within their borders, there are few standards guiding them as
to what constitutes sufficient alternative avenues of communication. 228
This situation arises primarily as a result of Renton.229 In Renton, the
Supreme Court upheld an ordinance allowing adult businesses on 5%
of Renton's total land area, but did not hold that such a percentage
was constitutionally mandated. 2"
Subsequent lower court opinions have further complicated the
issue by interpreting Renton differently."' Some appear to view the 5%
figure from Renton as constitutionally mandated. 232 For instance, in
1997, in Specialty Malls of Tampa, Inc. v. City of Tampa, a Florida district
court upheld a Tampa law making 7.5% of the city's land available to
adult business because this percentage exceeded the 5% found consti-
tutional in Renton.233 Consistent with this, in 2001, in University Books
& Videos, Inc. v. Miami-Dade County, another Florida district court held
that 0.0092% of Miami-Dade County acreage zoned for adult busi-
nesses was insufficient given the county's status as a large metropoli-
tan area with a population of well over one million." 234
Other courts, however, have upheld laws that make less than 5%
of a municipality's land available to adult businesses on the theory
that the size and character of a municipality should influence what
constitutes an appropriate percentage. 235 For instance, in 1999, in
D.H.L. Associates v. O'Gorman, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit upheld an ordinance that left only 0.09687% of the land in
Tyngsborough, Massachusetts, (population 9500) available to adult
businesses.235 In holding as much, the court noted that "an analysis
of the alternative avenues requirement in Renton] should encompass
a variety of factors," one of which was Tyngsborough's status as a rural
town with very little commercially zoned land. 237 Thus, disparate in-
terpretations reveal the lack of guidance afforded to rural and resi-
229 See Phillips, supra note 174, at 321.
229 Sce id.; see also Renton, 475 U.S. at 54.
550 See 475 U.S. at 53-54.
23) Sec e.g., D.H.L. Assocs. v. O'Gorman, 199 F.3d 50, 60 (1st Cir. 1999); Univ. Books
Videos, Inc. v. Miami-Dade County, 132 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1014 (S.D. Fla. 2001); Specialty
Malls of Tampa v. City of Tampa, 916 F. Supp. 1222, 1231 (M.D. Fla. 1996).
232
 See, e.g., Specialty Malls of Tampa, 916 F. Supp. at 1231.
222 See id.
234 See 132 F. Supp. 2d at 1014.
222 See O'Gorman, 199 F.3d at 59-60.
299 See id. Five available sites were located within this available area. Id. at 60.
237 Id.
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dential municipalities as to what constitutes adequate alternative ave-
nues of communication under Renton 2s$
C. Inability to Enact Sufficient Distancing Requirements
The uncertainty with respect to what constitutes sufficient alter-
native avenues of communication is complicated by an additional
drafting problem—namely, an inability to enact sufficient distancing
requirements.m In Young v. American. Mini Theatres, Inc., the U.S. Su-
preme Court upheld a zoning ordinance requiring dispersal of adult-
entertainment businesses. 2" Municipalities that choose to enact a dis-
tancing requirement must determine what constitutes an appropriate
buffer zone between adult businesses and other adult businesses,
places of worship, schools, or residential areas. 241 Rural and residen-
tial municipalities that attempt to enact a buffer zone similar to that
of larger cities, however, may often find that the buffer effectively pre-
cludes any adult businesses from operating within their borders or
leaves too little space to be considered adequate alternative avenues
of communication. 242
This scenario is aptly illustrated by a situation resulting from New
Jersey's statewide adult business location restriction, as upheld in Sad-
dle Brook.243 The law required a 1000-foot buffer between any adult
business and places of worship, school and school bus stops, munici-
pal or county playgrounds, and residential areas. 244 A buffer of this
size is consistent with those employed by cities whose ordinances the
Supreme Court has reviewed and upheld. 2" In a town the size of Sad-
dle Brook, however, a buffer zone of 1000 feet effectively banned any
adult businesses from legally operating within city limits, even though
the ban was no more restrictive than adult-entertainment zoning laws
238
 See Renton, 475 U.S. at 54; GERARD, supra note 100, at 214-16.
238 See Crysta4 569 N.W.2d at 227.
248 427 U.S. 50, 72-73 (1976) (plurality opinion).
241 See id. (plurality opinion)
242 See Crysta4 569 N.W.2d at 227.
243 See 722 A.2d at 531; DeMasters, supra note 8, at 6.
244 Saddle Brook, 722 A.2d at 532.
243 See City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 430 (2002) (plurality
opinion); Renton, 475 U.S. at 43. The law in Renton, for instance, placed a 1000-foot buffer
between adult businesses and churches, parks, schools, or residential areas. See Renton, 475
U.S. at 43; see also Los Angeles, 535 U.S. at 430 (plurality opinion) (holding constitutional an
ordinance that placed a 1000-foot buffer between adult businesses and a 500-foot buffer
between such businesses and churches, schools, and parks).
652	 Boston College Law Review
	 [Vol. 46:625
upheld by the Supreme Court. 245
 Thus, a buffer zone or distancing
requirement that is acceptable in larger cities may fail to provide any
space for adult-entertainment businesses in rural and residential mu-
nicipalities—a result problematic under Renton's alternative avenues
requirement. 247
For rural and residential municipalities that lack statewide zoning
of adult businesses,248
 this may mean that they are forced to enact
adult-entertainment zoning laws with smaller distancing requirements
to ensure available space for adult-entertainment businesses. 249 Smaller
buffer zones, however, are less restrictive of the location of adult busi-
nesses, and consequently less protective of residential areas. 25°
This was the situation that faced Crystal, Minnesota, a largely resi-
dential municipality, which was forced to enact a less restrictive distanc-
ing requirement because of its small size. 251 In 1997, in City of Crystal v.
Fantasy House, Inc., the Court of Appeals of Minnesota upheld an ordi-
nance requiring a 250-foot buffer zone between prohibited businesses
and residential areas, daycares, libraries, parks, places of worship, and
playgrounds. 252
 Crystal had enacted this requirement only after realiz-
ing that a 1000-foot buffer zone effectively precluded all adult busi-
nesses from operating in the municipality. 255
 Crystal's decision to re-
duce its adult business buffer zone is indicative of the problem rural
and residential municipalities face. 254
 Such municipalities must enact
2" See Saddle Brook, 722 A.2d at 532; see also Los Angeles, 535 U.S. at 430 (plurality opin-
ion); Renton, 475 U.S. at 43; Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 52 (1976) (plu-
rality opinion).
247
 See Saddle Brook., 722 A.2d at 532.
2" All states but New Jersey lack a statewide restriction on the location of adult enter-
tainment. NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:34-7(a) (West 2004); DeMasters, supra note 8, at 6.
249
 See Crystal, 569 N.W.2d at 227.
25° See id.; MINN. ATTORNEY GENERAL, supra note 5, at 529-30. This approach is consis-
tent with the prevailing view that the concentration of adult businesses produces harmful
secondary effects to the surrounding areas, including prostitution, theft, and other violent
and nonviolent crime. See, e.g., Los Angeles, 535 U.S. at 430 {plurality opinion); Renton, 475
U.S. at 51. Contra Bryant Paul et al., Government Regulation of Adult" Businesses Through
Zoning and Anti-Nudity Ordinances: Debunking the Legal Myth of Negative Secondary Effects, 6
Comm. L. & PoL'Y 355, 391 (2001).
"I See Crystal, 569 N.W.2d at 227.
231 Id.
253 See id. Crystal realized this through the enactment of an ordinance referred to in
Crystal as the "interim ordinance? See id. It is unclear from the opinion if the ordinance
was intended as interim when it was enacted, or only later when it was discovered to have
created a total ban on adult businesses. See id. The interim ordinance was upheld by the
Court of Appeals of Minnesota because it was considered a valid moratorium on zoning
while studies were conducted and permanent zoning was adopted. Id. at 231.
454 See id.
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smaller buffer zones than larger cities to satisfy the alternative avenues
requirement, even if they are more susceptible than larger cities to the
negative secondary effects of adult-entertainment businesses.255
D. Lack of Regional Zoning of Adult Businesses
The inequity and inconsistency created by buffer zones of varying
sizes is evident in the fourth and final problem facing rural and resi-
dential municipalities: a general, though not universal, lack of re-
gional zoning of adult businesses. 250 When no regional zoning restric-
tion on adult businesses exists, courts limit themselves to examining
the alternative avenues of communication available within the mu-
nicipality.257 In doing so, they may ignore significant nearby opportu-
nities for adult entertainment that would satisfy the alternative ave-
nues requirement of Renton and lessen a rural or residential
municipality's burden to provide space for adult businesses. 258
The value of regional zoning is evident in the New Jersey Su-
preme Court's decision in Saddle Brook.259 In Saddle Brook, the court
evaluated a statewide, rather than municipal, restriction on the loca-
tion of adult businesses.260 Because it was evaluating a statewide zon-
ing statute rather a municipal ordinance, the court's analysis of po-
tential alternative avenues of communication was not restricted to
municipal boundaries, but rather included available alternative loca-
tions in the surrounding region.26i Although the court in Saddle Brook
limited its holding to statewide statutes, the fundamental premise of
the case arguably applies to countywide or region-wide zoning restric-
tions as wel1. 262 In contrast to Saddle Brook, residential and rural mu-
nicipalities that lack countywide or statewide zoning are left to their
own devices to identify alternative locations within their boundaries,
even if such sites already exist in nearby locations. 263 Given the already
263 See id.; MINN. ATTORNEY GENERAL, supra note 5, at 529-30.
236 See DeMasters, supra note 8, at 6; see also Saddle Brook, 722 A.2d at 532. New jersey, as
discussed in Saddle Brook, is a notable exception. See Saddle Brook, 722 A.2d at 532.
07 See Schad, 452 U.S. at 76. Contra Diamond, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 638 (suggesting that ar-
eas outside of Taft's city limits were within the city's "Sphere of Influence").
258 See Renton, 475 U.S. at 53-54; Schad, 452 U.S. at 76; Diamond, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 638.
236 See 722 A.2d at 531.
266 See id. at 532-33.
261 See id. at 532.
262 See id. at 532-33; see also Schad, 452 U.S. at 76 (holding that Mount Ephraim cannot
point to sites beyond city boundaries as alternative avenues of communication because
"[t]here is no countywide zoning in Camden County").
283 See Diamond, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 638,646.
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identified complications such municipalities face in zoning adult
businesses, the lack of a broader regional approach is only an addi-
tional hindrance. 264
III. ZONING ADULT-ENTERTAINMENT BUSINESSES CONSISTENT
WITH THE FIRST AMENDMENT: SOLUTIONS FOR RURAL
AND RESIDENTIAL MUNICIPALITIES
Short of a new U.S. Supreme Court opinion clarifying some of the
issues within the alternative avenues requirement as applied to adult-
entertainment businesses, regional and rural municipalities face
difficult problems when zoning adult entertainment. 265
 This Note has
identified four problems with the Supreme Court's First Amendment
jurisprudence as applied to adult-entertainment zoning creates for
such municipalities. 266
 First, the Court's adult-entertainment zoning
case law leaves unclear whether some municipalities may enact a total
ban on adult entertainment. 267
 Second, there is contradicting prece-
dent as to what constitutes sufficient alternative avenues of conununica-
tion.268
 Third, rural and residential municipalities are often forced to
enact less restrictive distancing requirements than larger cities, argua-
bly increasing the risk to security and quality of life in the municipal-
ity.269
 Finally, rural and residential municipalities are disadvantaged by a
general lack of countywide or statewide zoning of adult-entertainment
businesses. 270
 This Note now proposes three solutions which, when
combined or adopted independently, will address these problems."'
A. Adopt Countywide or Statewide Location Restrictions on Adult Businesses
State and county legislatures should consider regionalized ap-
proaches to restrictions on the location of adult-entertainment busi-
nesses.272
 New Jersey's statewide statute requiring the distancing of
264 See id.; Crystal, 569 N.W.2d at 227.
265 See Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 53-54 (1986); Diamond v. City of
Taft, 29 F. Supp. 2d 633, 646 (E.D. Cal. 1998), affd, 215 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2000), cert.
denied, 531 U.S. 1072 (2001); City of Crystal v. Fantasy House, Inc., 569 N.W.2d 225, 227
(Minn. Ct. App. 1997).
266
	 supra notes 219-264 and accompanying text.
267
 See Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 75 n.18 (1981).
269 See Phillips, supra note 174, at 321; see also Renton, 475 U.S. at 54; D.H.L. Assocs. v.
O'Gorman, 199 F.3d 50, 59-60 (1st Cir. 1999).
269 See Crystal, 569 N.W.2d at 227.
270 See Diamond, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 638.
271 See infra notes 272-305 and accompanying text.
272 See Township of Saddle Brook v. A.B. Family Ctr., Inc., 722 A.2d 530, 532 (NJ. 1999).
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adult businesses from each other and from places of public worship,
schools, playgrounds, and residential areas is an example of this. 278 As
discussed earlier, this statute requires a 1000-foot buffer zone between
such businesses unless the municipality in question chooses to "over-
ride the statutory limitation by [enacting] a local zoning ordinance
more permissive than the state statute." 274
Assuming the municipality in question chooses not to enact a
more permissive restriction, the benefits of a state statute restricting the
location of adult-entertainment businesses are clear in light of the Su-
preme Court's case law, 275 In Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, the
Court struck down a city's ordinance prohibiting adult entertain-
ment.278 In so holding, the Court rejected the argument that a region-
alized approach to the alternative avenues requirement is justified
when there is no countywide zoning in the area. 277 The implication of
Scharf s reasoning is that the presence of a countywide or statewide zon-
ing restriction, instead of a municipal restriction, should permit a more
regionalized analysis of the area's alternative avenues of communica-
tion.278 A regionalized approach to adult-entertainment businesses en-
sures that the community as a whole bears the burden of secondary
effects equally, while still permitting some municipalities to increase
their burden through a local ordinance if they foresee potential
benefits from adult businesses. 279
B. Employ a Regional Analysis of the Alternative Avenues Requirement
Absent countywide or statewide zoning restrictions on adult busi-
nesses, courts should apply a broader analysis of the alternative ave-
nues requirement.28° In City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., the U.S.
Supreme Court held that an adult-entertainment zoning ordinance is
constitutional if it (1) is intended to serve a substantial governmental
interest and (2) permits reasonable alternative avenues of comnriuni-
cation. 281 As Renton made clear, the alternative avenues requirement is
272 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:34-7(a) (West 2004); see also Saddle Brook, 722 A.2d at 532.
274 Saddle Brook, 722 A.2d at 535; see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:34-.7(a).
275 See id. at 535-36; see also Schad, 452 U.S. at 76-77.
276 Sce Schad, 452 U.S. at 76-77.
277 See id.
275
 See id.; see also Saddle Brook, 722 A.2d at 532-33.
27° See Saddle Brook, 722 A.2d at 535-36.
285
 See Schad, 452 U.S. at 79 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 85 n.11 (Stevens,J., concur-
ring); id. at 87 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
281 See 475 U.S. at 50.
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crucial because the First Amendment guarantees a citizen's right to
share his or her message with others—a right, moreover, that cannot
be suppressed merely on the grounds that it can be exercised else-
where.282
 Accordingly, adult businesses must be guaranteed space to
operate where patrons may visit if they choose. 285 Arguably, whether
or not that space is within the municipal city limits of a rural or resi-
dential community or directly outside seems less significant so long as
adult businesses continue to retain reasonable—and therefore
nearby—opportunities to open and operate. 284
This regionalized approach to the alternative avenues require-
ment, moreover, is arguably permissible under Schad so long as the
municipality can demonstrate the locations and proximity of these
nearby alternative avenues : 285 In Schad, the U.S. Supreme Court re-
jected the city's argument for a region-wide analysis of the alternative
avenues requirement largely because the record failed to show any
evidence of availability in nearby areas. 288
 This rationale thus leaves
open the possibility that a record providing evidence of nearby loca-
tions for adult businesses could satisfy the alternative avenues re-
quirement.287 Accordingly, Schad should be viewed not as foreclosing
the opportunity for a regional analysis of the alternative avenues re-
quirement, but rather, only as setting a high standard for its use. 288
Furthermore, to address Schad's concern that cities not shirk
their obligation to ensure alternative avenues of communication for
adult businesses, courts should place the burden of proof for the al-
ternative avenues requirement on the municipality. 288 Municipalities
282 See id.; Heffron v. Intl Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 654-55
(1981); Schad, 452 U.S. at 76-77.
282 See Renton, 475 U.S. at 53-54.
284 See Renton, 475 U.S. at 53-54; Schad, 452 U.S. at 79 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 85
n.11 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 87 (Burger, CJ., dissenting). But see Schad, 452 U.S. at
78 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("Were I a resident of Mount Ephraim, I would not expect
my right to attend the theater or to purchase a novel to be contingent upon the availability
of such opportunities in 'nearby' Philadelphia, a community in whose decisions I would
have no political voice.").
282 See 452 U.S. at 76, 79 (Powell, j., concurring); id. at 85 n.11 (Stevens, J., concur-
ring); id. at 87 (Burger, Cj., dissenting).
286 gee id. at 76 ("[T]here is no evidence in [the] record to support the proposition




288 See id. at 76; id. at 79 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 85 n.11 (Stevens, J., concur-
ring); id. at 87 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
21° See id. at 76-77; Saddle Brook, 722 A.2d at 536 ("[W]e believe it to be consistent with
First Amendment decisional law that recognizes the fairness of imposing on the public
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will then retain responsibility for ensuring nearby, available, and
sufficient alternative avenues of communication, regardless of
whether those avenues are located within or outside the municipal-
ity.290 With this safeguard in place, courts could employ a broader
analysis of the alternative avenues requirement without forgoing any
of the accountability provided by a citywide analysis. 29 '
C. Adopt a Supply-and-Demand Analysis of the Alternative
Avenues Requirement
A third and final solution to the problems rural and residential
municipalities face likewise involves the analysis a court may use when
considering the alternative avenues requirement. 292 Courts should ap-
ply a supply-and-demand analysis when determining whether a munici-
pality has provided adequate alternative avenues of communication. 293
A supply-and-demand approach would stipulate that a restriction on
adult-entertainment business provides alternative avenues of communi-
cation if the available number of sites exceeds the demand for those
sites coming from current and prospective adult-entertainment busi-
nesses.294
 This approach thus would ensure that municipal ordinances
do not prevent adult-entertainment businesses from identifying legiti-
mate locations in which to operate 29  This is in contrast to methods of
analysis that look purely at the percentage of land available or the
number of sites available without regard to demand. 296
The simplicity of the supply-and-demand approach is appeal-
ing. 297 All that must be known to analyze the alternative avenues re-
quirement is the number of existing sites and the demand by adult
businesses for sites in the municipality.298 Moreover, this method en-
body that elects to restrict protected speech the obligation of demonstrating that its re-
strictions are reasonably tailored to achieve its objectives ... and provide adequate avail-
able alternative avenues of communication.").
290 See Schad, 452 U.S. at 76-77; Saddle Brook, 722 A.2d at 536.
291
 See Saddle Brook, 722 A.2d at 536.
292 See Phillips, supra note 174, at 322-23.
293
 See id.
299 See Lakeland Lounge of Jackson, Inc. v. City of Jackson, 973 F.2d 1255, 1260 (5th
Cir. 1992).
299 See Phillips, supra note 174, at 341.
2" See Renton, 475 U.S. at 53-54; O'Gorman, 199 F.3d at 60.
297 See Diamond, 29 F. Sup!). 2d at 646 ("Without considering both producer supply and
consumer demand, there can be no meaningful determination of whether the First
Amendment's purposes in guaranteeing reasonable alternative avenues of communication
are satisfied."); Phillips, supra note 174, at 340-42.
298
 See Lakeland Lounge, 973 F.2d at 1260.
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sures that residential and rural communities are not forced to provide
more space than the market requires. 299
Problems with the supply-and-demand approach are minimal. 509
Demand for available sites by current and prospective adult businesses
arguably can be determined in a number of ways, and some of this
uncertainty undoubtedly leads to some indeterminacy in the analy-
sis.301
 Additionally, the demand for sites coming from adult businesses
likely changes in a community over time, making the supply-and-
demand method a less than ideal long-term approach. 992
 As a result,
adult-entertainment zoning restrictions would still need to be revis-
ited over time.905
 Nevertheless, the supply-and-demand approach en-
sures that rural and residential communities are required to offer al-
ternative avenues of communication only to actual and prospective
adult businesses. 904
 Given the inherently changing role of adult busi-
nesses in any community, this flexibility is desirable. 905
CONCLUSION
Every community faces the difficult problem of restricting, but
nevertheless allowing, adult-entertainment businesses. Given the var-
ied concerns about the secondary effects of such businesses, munici-
palities both large and small have struggled over the years to deter-
mine how best to allow them while minimizing their potential
negative impacts to neighborhoods and community institutions. In
these respects, rural and residential communities are no different
than larger cities like Detroit, New York, and Boston, and suburban
cities like Renton. Rural and residential communities, however, do
face a unique burden in determining what will satisfy their constitu-
tional obligations as to alternative avenues of communication. Courts
299 See Woodall v. City of El Paso, 49 F.3d 1120, 1127 (5th Cir. 1995).
3D° See Phillips, supra note 174, at 340-42.
"I See Lim v. City of Long Beach, 12 F. Supp. 2d 1050, 1066 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (deter-
mining that courts compare the number of available sites to (1) the municipality's popula-
don, (2) the existing number of adult businesses, or (3) the number of businesses wishing
to offer adult entertainment); see also N. Ave. Novelties, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 88 KM 441,
445 (7th Cir. 1996) (determining the number of businesses wishing to offer adult enter-
tainment by the number of inquiries Chicago's zoning department received in a year re-
garding potential adult businesses),
3°2 See Phillips, supra note 174, at 351 ("[O]ver time, a community's demand for adult
entertainment may change.").
" See id.
SU See id. at 340.
505 See id. at 352-53.
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should be sensitive to these burdens, and should seek out new ap-
proaches—within the scope of the U.S. Supreme Court's precedent—
to evaluate rural and residential communities' First Amendment obli-
gations. Short of such changes, some communities will continue to be
burdened unfairly by a constitutional analysis primarily developed in
consideration of larger and more commercial cities.
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